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We study the advantages of quantum strategies in evolutionary social dilemmas on evolving ran-
dom networks. We focus our study on the two-player games: prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift and
stag-hunt games. The obtained result show the benefits of quantum strategies for the prisoner’s
dilemma game. For the other two games, we obtain regions of parameters where the quantum
strategies dominate, as well as regions where the classical strategies coexist.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a widely studied branch of science with
broad applications in a plethora of fields. These range
from biology to social sciences and economics. It has
been especially useful in the study of social dilemmas,
i.e.situations where the benefit of the many should be put
in front of the benefit of the individual. One of the most
frequently studied approaches in this context is the evolu-
tionary game theory [1]. The field of evolutionary games
has since evolved and now studies not only games on
regular grids, but also on complex graphs [2]. Recently,
there are studies focused on studying social dilemmas on
evolving random networks [3, 4].
In quantum game theory [5–8] we allow the agents to
use quantum strategies alongside classical ones. As this
is a far larger set of possible players’ moves, it offers the
possibility of much more diverse behavior. The most out-
standing example of this, is the fact that if only one player
is aware of the quantum nature of the game, he/she will
never lose in some types of games. If both players are
aware of the nature of the game, one of them might still
cheat by appending additional qubits to the system [9].
When we take decoherence into account, the game be-
havior changes. In particular, the well known Nash equi-
librium of a game can shift to a different strategy [10].
Furthermore, quantum game theory allows us to solve
dilemmas present in classical game theory, like the pris-
oner’s dilemma [11]. On top of this, there also exists a
quantum version of the Parrondo’s paradox [12, 13]. Fi-
nally, there quantum pseudo-telepathy games. In these
games, players utilizing quantum strategies and quantum
entanglement, may seem to an outside observer as com-
municating telepathically [14–16].
The combination of the fields of quantum game theory
and evolutionary games has led to numerous results [17–
20]. There exist cases where the quantum strategies dom-
inate the entire network. In this work we aim to study
the behavior of three quantum games on evolving ran-
dom networks: prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift and stag-
hunt games. The transition between these games will be
achieved by manipulating the parameters of the game.
∗ lpawela@iitis.pl
Games on evolving networks have been studied in the
classical [2, 4] as well as quantum settings [21]. The evo-
lution of of the network can be seen as aging of the agents.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we intro-
duce quantum games. In Sec. III we discuss the model of
networks used in this work. Sec. IV contains the results
along with discussions. Finally, in Sec. V we draw the
final conclusions.
II. QUANTUM GAMES
We call a game a quantum game if the players par-
ticipating are allowed to use quantum strategies. By
quantum strategies we understand moves that have no
justification in classical game theory, but have a good in-
terpretation in the realm of quantum mechanics. We will
focus on two-player games. Henceforth we will call the
players Alice and Bob.
A. General concepts
Formally, a two-player quantum game is a tuple Γ =
(H, ρ, SA, SB, PA, PB). Here H is a Hilbert space of the
system used in the quantum game, ρ is the system’s ini-
tial state. Note that ρ is a positive operator with unit
trace, i.e.ρ ≥ 0 and Trρ = 1. Allowed Alice’s and Bob’s
strategies are given by the sets SA and SB respectively.
Their payoff functions are given by PA and PB. They
are funtions mapping players strategies to numerical val-
ues. In general the strategies sA ∈ SA and sB ∈ SB can
be any quantum operations. A definition of a quantum
game may contain additional rules like the ordering of
players or the number of times they are allowed to make
a move.
By analogy to the classical game theory we may define
the following quantities in quantum game theory. We
will call a strategy sA the dominant strategy of Alice if
P (sA, s
′
B) ≥ P (s′A, s′B) for all sA ∈ SA, s′B ∈ SB. Fal-
lowing this pattern we may define a dominant strategy
for Bob. A pair of strategies (sA, sB) is an equilibrium in
dominant strategies if and only if sA and sB are Alice’s
and Bob’s dominant strategies. A pair of strategies is
Pareto optimal if it not possible to increase one player’s
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2payoff without decreasing the other player’s payoff. Fi-
nally, we define a Nash equilibrium as a set of strategies,
such that no player can do better by unilaterally chang-
ing their strategy. This will be further discussed when
we introduce the quantum prisoner’s dilemma game.
B. Quantizing the prisoner’s dilemma, stag hunt
and snowdrift games
The setup in the quantum case is as follows. Each
player is given by a referee a single qubit and may only
operate on it locally. Hence we have sA, sB ∈ SU(2),
where SU(2) is the set of unitary 2 × 2 matrices with
unit determinant. Initially, the qubits are entangled:
|φ〉 = J |00〉, (1)
where J is the entangling operator [22]:
J =
1√
2
(1⊗ 1 + iσx ⊗ σx). (2)
Here σx is the Pauli matrix:
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
. (3)
Next, the players apply their respective strategies UA and
UB and the untangling operator J
† is applied by the ref-
eree. Here J† denotes the Hermitian conjugate of J . The
final state of the system is:
|ψ〉 = J†(UA ⊗ UB)J |φ〉. (4)
This is shown as a quantum circuit in Fig. 1.
|0〉
J
UA
J†
|0〉 UB
FIG. 1: Quantum circuit depicting a two-player
quantum game. Here J is the entangling operator and
UA and UB denote Alice’s and Bob’s strategy
respectively.
The payoff matrix of a two player game with cooper-
ators C and defectors D is shown in Tab. II B. In the
table R is the reward, P is the punishment for mutual
defection, S is know as the sucker’s payoff and finally the
parameter T is the defector temptation. In our anal-
ysis we set R = 1 and P = 0. The remaining two
parameters range is S ∈ [−1, 1] and T ∈ [0, 2]. When
T > R > P > S we get a social dilemma - the prisoner’s
dilemma. Note that on the one hand, in this case the
strategy profile (C,C) is Pareto optimal, but on the other
hand the profile (D,D) is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, we
have the dilemma. Next, when T > R > S > P we get
Bob: C Bob: D
Alice: C (R, R) (S, T )
Alice: D (T , S) (P , P )
TABLE I: Payoff matrix of a two-player game with
cooperators C and defectors D.
the snowdrift game. Finally, when R > T > P > S we
get the stag-hunt game.
In the quantum case, the payoff of Alice is determined
by:
PA = R|〈ψ|00〉|2 + S|〈ψ|01〉|2 + T |〈ψ|10〉|2 + P |〈ψ|11〉|2.
(5)
Aside from the two classical strategies, we introduce
two quantum strategies. The first one is the Hadamard
strategy, H. It introduces a miracle move [5] in the pris-
oners dilemma game, that is it allows the player to always
win against the other player’s classical strategy. The sec-
ond strategy, denoted by Q will introduce a new Nash
equilibrium in the prisoners dilemma game, for the strat-
egy profile (Q,Q).
We associate the player’s strategies with the following
unitary matrices:
C =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, D =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
H =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, Q =
(
i 0
0 −i
)
.
(6)
III. SIMULATION SETUP
We set the population size to 2500 agents located at
the nodes of an Erdo¨s–Re´nyi graph. The initial number
of edges is set to 10000. Each agent is assigned an ini-
tial strategy at random. We study the following initial
assignments:
1. The classical strategies, S1 = {C,D}. Initial these
strategies are assigned with probability 50% each.
2. Classical strategies and the miracle move, S2 =
{C,D,H}. The initial probabilities of assignment
of C, D and H are 49%, 49% and 2% respectively.
3. Classical strategies and the quantum Nash equilib-
rium, S3 = {C,D,Q}. The initial probabilities of
assignment of C, D and Q are 49%, 49% and 2%
respectively.
4. All four strategies, S3 = {C,D,H,Q}. The initial
probabilities of assignment of C, D, H and Q are
49%, 49%, 1% and 1% respectively.
The evolution of the network is performed via Monte
Carlo simulation. First, we select a random agent x and
3his random neighbor, y. Next, each of them acquires
their payoff, px and py respectively by playing with all of
their neighbors. Finally, if px > py, agent y may adopt
the strategy of agent x with probability:
W =
px − py
αmax(kx, ky)
, (7)
where kx and ky are degrees of nodes x and y respec-
tively and α is a constant dependent on the game. We
have α = T − S for the prisoner’s dilemma, α = T − P
for the snowdrift and α = R− S for the stag-hunt game.
When an agent x adopts a new strategy, we remove all
edges connecting him/her to other agents, except for the
one connecting to the donor agent. As this scheme will
quickly lead to the creation of disjoint graphs, we allow
the agents to form new links at the end of each Monte
Carlo step. Each agent is allowed to connect to a uni-
formly randomly chosen node he/she is not connected to.
To avoid creating very big graphs, we set a limit on an
agent’s degree, kmax. We set kmax = 500. If an agent has
a degree greater or equal to kmax, we remove all outgoing
edges, except for one, randomly chosen. The agent keeps
his/hers strategy. This process simulates the aging and
dying of agents. On average, every agent is chosen once
per Monte Carlo step. We set the number of steps to
104. We obtain the fractions of strategies by averaging
the last 103 steps.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
First, we present the results for the classical strategies
alone. These are shown in Fig. 2. These are with good
agreement with previously found results [4]. Note that
in the snowdrift game we find the region, where the frac-
tions of strategies transfer smoothly from the dominance
of the C to the dominance of the D strategy. We study
one line across this region, shown as the solid gray line
in Fig. 2. Instead of averaging, we show only the frac-
tions for the last iterations of the Monte Carlo process.
This is shown in Fig. 3. In Fig. 4 we show full Monte
Carlo history for a few selected points along the line in
Fig. 3. This shows that the strategies achieve their equi-
librium fractions quickly, with only minor changes after
the first 2 ·103 steps. The parameter r in Fig. 3 gives the
parameters S and T as:
S = 1− r
T = 1 + r
. (8)
Note that al the figures show a very smooth transition
between the C and D dominance case.
Next, we study the case where we introduce the miracle
move strategy, H. The fractions of strategies are shown
in Fig. 5.In this case we obtain different behavior com-
pared to the classical case. First of all, the strategy D
does not dominate in the prisoner’s dilemma case. This
region of parameters T and S is now dominated by the
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FIG. 2: Results for the classical strategies. Panel (a)
shows the fraction of C strategy, ρC , and panel (b)
shows the fraction of strategy D, ρD. Dashed black
lines mark the boundaries between the different game
types. The labels correspond to prisoner’s dilemma
(PD), snowdrift (SD) and stag-hunt games (SH). The
solid gray lines show the regions which were examined
in detail.
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FIG. 3: Behavior of the fraction of strategy C, ρC and
the fraction of strategy D, ρD along the line shown in
Fig. 2. The parameter r gives the values of S = 1− r
and T = 1 + r.
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FIG. 4: Full Monte Carlo history of the fractions of
strategies C denoted ρC and D denoted ρD.
quantum strategy H. In the stag-hunt game, a transition
between the dominance of D and H emerges. In some re-
gions the transition is smooth, while other regions show
a sharp transition. This is studied in the same manner
as described in the previous paragraph. We show this
results in Figs. 6 and 7. We should note here, that we
observe two behaviors here which depend on the parame-
ter’s values. In the first case the system quickly converges
to total dominance of the C strategy. In the second case,
first the fraction of D strategy rises, and next starts to
drop in favor of the miracle move H.
Furthermore, in the snowdrift game case, the region
where strategies C and D coexist is much smaller com-
pared to the classical case. This now occurs only in the
case when S > T − 1. For other values of S and T in
this region we get a sharp transition to full dominance of
the strategy H. This is shown in more detail in Figs. 8
and 9. Studying the results across the line in the up-
per right corner of Fig. 5 we should note that at first we
get the dominance of the cooperators. The fraction of
cooperators starts to decrease with r up until r = 0.5
when we get the dominance of the miracle move. Ana-
lyzing the detailed histories of the strategy fractions, we
note that with increasing T the fraction of miracle moves
rises faster, but the fraction of the strategies C and D is
almost equal to each other.
When we introduce the strategy Q with the classi-
cal ones, the behavior changes slightly, compared to the
case studied in the case of the miracle move, H. This
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FIG. 5: Results for the classical strategies. Panel (a)
shows the fraction of C strategy, ρC , panel (b) shows
the fraction of strategy D, ρD and panel (c) shows the
fraction of the strategy H, ρH . Dashed black lines mark
the boundaries between the different game types. The
labels correspond to prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift
(SD) and stag-hunt games (SH). The solid gray lines
show the regions which were examined in detail.
is shown in Figs. 10, 11 and 12. We do not have the
region in the stag-hunt game where there a transition
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FIG. 6: Behavior of the fraction of strategy C, ρC , the
fraction of D, ρD and the fraction of strategy H, ρH
along the line shown in the lower left corner of Fig. 5.
The parameter r gives the values of S = − 34 − 14r and
T = 14r.
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FIG. 7: Full Monte Carlo history of the fractions of
strategies C, denoted ρC , D denoted ρD and H,
denoted ρH .
between C and Q. Instead, the entire region is split in
half, where one is dominated by the strategy C and the
other by strategy Q. In the snowdrift region, the tran-
sition between coexistence of C and D and dominance
of Q i much sharper compared to the miracle move case.
The prisoner’s dilemma region is again dominated by the
quantum strategy Q.
Finally, when we introduce all four strategies, we ob-
tain results similar to the case with the Q strategy only.
Again, all interesting regions are dominated by the strat-
egy Q. This is shown in detail in Figs. 13, 14 and 15.
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FIG. 8: Behavior of the fraction of strategy C, denoted
ρC , the fraction of D, denoted ρD and the fraction of
strategy H, denoted ρH along the line shown in the
upper right corner of Fig. 5. The parameter r gives the
values of S = 1− r and T = 1 + r.
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FIG. 9: Full Monte Carlo history of the fractions of
strategies C, denoted ρC , D denoted ρD and H,
denoted ρH .
V. CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, we studied evolutionary cooperation on
evolving random networks with quantum agents. We
identified regions of parameters where quantum strate-
gies dominate the network as well as studied in detail
regions with coexistence of strategies. These are differ-
ent for the classical and quantum cases. Furthermore,
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FIG. 10: Results for the classical strategies. Panel (a)
shows the fraction of C strategy, ρC , panel (b) shows
the fraction of strategy D, ρD and panel (c) shows the
fraction of the strategy Q, ρQ. Dashed black lines mark
the boundaries between the different game types. The
labels correspond to prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift
(SD) and stag-hunt games (SH). The solid gray lines
show the regions which were examined in detail.
introduction of the quantum miracle move introduces a
new region where the classical strategies coexists in the
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FIG. 11: Behavior of the fraction of strategy C, denoted
ρC , the fraction of D, ρD and the fraction of strategy
Q, denoted ρQ along the line shown in the upper right
corner of Fig. 10. The parameter r gives the values of
S = 1− r and T = 1 + r.
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FIG. 12: Full Monte Carlo history of the fractions of
strategies C, denoted ρC , D denoted ρD and Q,
denoted ρQ.
stag-hunt game. We should further note that in the pris-
oner’s dilemma region, we always get a full domination of
the quantum strategies, when they are introduced. This
is consistent with previous results [17, 20].
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FIG. 13: Results for the classical strategies. Panel (a) shows the fraction of C strategy, ρC , panel (b) shows the
fraction of strategy D, ρD, panel (c) shows the fraction of the strategy H, ρH and panel (c) shows the fraction of the
strategy Q, ρQ. Dashed black lines mark the boundaries between the different game types. The labels correspond to
prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snowdrift (SD) and stag-hunt games (SH). The solid gray lines show the regions which
were examined in detail.
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FIG. 14: Behavior of the fraction of strategy C, denoted
ρC , the fraction of D, ρD, fraction of strategy H,
denoted ρH , and the fraction of strategy Q, denoted ρQ
along the line shown in the upper right corner of
Fig. 13. The parameter r gives the values of S = 1− r
and T = 1 + r.
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FIG. 15: Full Monte Carlo history of the fractions of
strategies C, denoted ρC , D denoted ρD, H, denoted
ρH , and Q, denoted ρQ.
